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ith the advent of the European Mon-
etary Union (EMU), members will
lose one policy tool (the exchange
rate) for dealing with asymmetric shocks to
their economies.  Consequently, some other
macroeconomic variable or market must
become more ﬂexible to eliminate excess
demand or supply of output and employ-
ment.  It is generally argued that labor mar-
kets must become more ﬂexible in Europe
to compensate for the loss of independent
monetary policies as a stabilization tool.
It is generally believed that ﬁring costs
in Europe are much higher than in the
United States, hence, to make labor markets
more ﬂexible, ﬁring costs need to be low-
ered.  Firing costs are affected by labor leg-
islation, and therefore, politics enter the
picture when discussing whether or not to
lower ﬁring costs.  While lowering ﬁring
costs will beneﬁt unemployed workers,
ﬁring costs generate rents for employed
workers and it is unlikely that workers
would give up those rents willingly.  There-
fore, to study the political viability of poli-
cies aimed at lowering ﬁring costs, we need
an economic model that reﬂects the bene-
ﬁts and costs of ﬁring costs in a dynamic
model of employment.  This is the task
undertaken by Gilles Saint-Paul in his paper.
Saint-Paul uses a pseudo-search/
matching model with exogenous produc-
tivity growth to study how ﬁring costs
affect the length of job matches.  A worker’s
productivity is constant during a match,
although average productivity is rising in
the economy.  Upon being ﬁred, a worker
instantly acquires the average level of pro-
ductivity in the economy.  
Firing costs generate “rents” for workers
that must be paid out of ﬁrm proﬁts:  After
some critical date, ﬁrms subsidize workers
whose wage exceeds their productivity,
since this is cheaper than ﬁring the workers
and incurring the ﬁring cost.  Thus, not
surprisingly, Saint-Paul ﬁnds that ﬁring
costs lengthen job matches and reduce the
probability that the unemployed workers
ﬁnd jobs.
The ﬁring cost has three key effects on
workers’ lifetime utility:
•  It lengthens the period they collect the
rent (improves utility).
•  It lowers the average productivity, and
thus, lifetime income (reduces utility).
•  It worsens the probability of ﬁnding a 
job when unemployed (reduces utility).
Having ascertained the beneﬁts and
costs to workers from the existence of
ﬁring costs, Saint-Paul then asks, “Who
would favor an increase in the magnitude
of ﬁring costs?”
He considers a majority-rule voting
equilibrium to see how individual workers
would vote between two possible ﬁring
cost policies to see if a majority of workers
would support changing the ﬁring cost
from its current level.  The author then
examines who would prefer moving
towards a higher ﬁring cost from the low
firing cost regime and vice versa.  It is clear
that unemployed workers always favor low-
ering ﬁring costs, since this would shorten
job matches and increase their probability
of ﬁnding a job.
What about employed workers?  They
typically divide into three groups based on
the relative age of their job.  Because the
rent is acquired towards the end of a match,
the present discounted value of the rent in
the future is of less value to workers in
“young” matches.  In general, the last two
effects dominate for these workers so they
oppose a policy that increases ﬁring costs.
Workers in old matches are collecting
the largest rent so they beneﬁt the most
from the ﬁrst effect.  Because they are near
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the end of their current match, however,
they worry the most about ﬁnding a job
since they soon will be unemployed.  This
latter effect is dominant for them.
Since the workers in relatively young
and relatively old matches support lower-
ing ﬁring costs, who is left to support the
policy?  Well, the only workers left are
those in middle-age matches.  The middle-
age workers are the ones just entering the
rent-collecting phase so reducing ﬁring
costs signiﬁcantly reduces the rents they
are about to collect.  Furthermore, their
match is still sufﬁciently young to make
the future cost of lower job-ﬁnding proba-
bility of little importance.  Consequently,
this is the group that would actually
support increasing ﬁring costs.
Saint-Paul shows that if high ﬁring
costs are the status quo, most of the cases
correspond to a majority of workers
favoring a move to lower ﬁring costs.  On
the other hand, if a low-ﬁring cost economy
is the status quo, then the outcome is not so
clear.  Under some parameterizations of the
model, workers would be in favor of moving
to a more rigid economy, while under other
parameterizations they will be opposed to it.
Finally, they may be divided over whether or
not to move to a more rigid economy.
As a friend of mine is fond of saying,
the value of discussing a paper is that you
have to dig into the assumptions of the
model and that is where all of the bodies
are buried.  Although all models have
bodies buried in them, with Saint-Paul’s
paper I often felt I was on the trail of a
serial killer.  So where are the bodies
buried in this model?
My ﬁrst question is—What are “ﬁrms”
in this model?  Who owns them and does it
matter?  In perfect competition with no
ﬁxed costs or capital, the wage bill is equal
to output, so workers extract the entire sur-
plus from production.  This is a common
view of ﬁrms in all constant-returns-to-scale
models of production—input payments
exhaust the output.  Hence, ﬁrms are
merely a veil.
With ﬁring costs, however, the ﬁrms
receive some surplus early in the match
and then subsidize workers later in the
match.  What do ﬁrms do with the surplus
and how do they pay for the subsidy that
occurs later in the match?  If they save it
to ﬁnance the subsidy later, then there
should be an intertemporal ﬁnancing con-
straint on the ﬁrms, much like a ﬁrm faces
with pension fund obligations.  An inter-
temporal ﬁnancing condition is missing in
the model.  If ﬁrms save the surplus early
in the match and use it to pay the rent to
workers later in the match, then workers
(in effect) are paying for the ﬁring costs
via smaller shares of the output earlier in
the match—something Saint-Paul was
trying to avoid.
If ﬁrms do not save their share of 
the surplus, what do they do with it?  Do
the owners of the ﬁrm consume it?  Is it
transferred to workers via lump-sum equi-
proportionate transfers?  If matches were
perfectly deterministic in length, then 
an intertemporal compensation scheme
would require ﬁrms have zero surpluses on
net.  In this model, however, some matches
end early for random reasons.  These ﬁrms
clearly end up with net surpluses from the
match.  What do they do with them?  The
model is completely silent on this entire
issue.  If ﬁrm owners receive some of the
surplus from trade, then they too will have
a stake, and presumably a vote, in any ref-
erendum on ﬁring cost.  But alas, in this
model, only workers vote—owners of ﬁrms
do not.
Why do workers prefer this type of com-
pensation scheme to some other?  The
author assumes that ﬁnancial markets are
perfect.  This implies that workers can
borrow and lend to achieve their desired
consumption path over time regardless of
the timing of income receipts.  In this case,
workers simply want the highest lifetime
present discounted value of income, which
occurs in a perfectly competitive labor mar-
ket.  Thus, why would workers want to
distort markets by voting for ﬁring costs?
Another problem I have is with the
voting analysis in the model.  Since voting
is over a single issue (ﬁring costs), then
the median voter model should work well.
Simply determine the magnitude of the
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1 Condorcet cycles arise when
preferences over outcomes are
intransitive, i.e., A is preferred
to B, B is preferred to C, but C
is preferred to A.
2 A similar problem occurs in
monetary search models with
barter trade; pairs of traders
who have a double-coincidence
of wants meet and trade but
then separate.  It seems irra-
tional to separate once traders
pair up in successful matches
but this is the typical assump-
tion of money search models
and, after reading this paper,
apparently also is typical of
labor search models.
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each worker by match age and take the
median value of those maximums.  The
only remaining question is whether the
median voter’s preferred ﬁring cost is zero.
Unfortunately, in this model, preferences
over ﬁring costs are not single-peaked.  The
reason for this is that a vote by the majority
to lower ﬁring costs would cause workers
in old matches to be ﬁred immediately.
Being ﬁred lowers utility due to job loss
but also causes an immediate increase in
productivity that raises the probability of
ﬁnding a job and, therefore, increases life-
time utility.  Hence, there is a certain age
of a match in which these two forces offset
each other and workers are indifferent to
lowering ﬁring costs and leaving them
unchanged.  Consequently, preferences over
firing-cost policies are not single-peaked,
which creates multiplicity of voting equi-
libria and possibly Condorcet voting cycles.1
This greatly complicates the analysis of the
voting equilibrium and requires numerical
analysis to study the problem.
There is an easy way around this 
voting complexity—grandfathering.  
The source of the voting complexity arises
from the threat that older workers will be
ﬁred if ﬁring costs are lowered.  To elimi-
nate this, simply grandfather all current
matches against the change in ﬁring costs
and only apply the lower ﬁring costs to
new matches.  Grandfathering current
voters from the undesirable consequences
of changed policies is an age-old method
of pushing through socially desirable poli-
cies.  As an example, a university I was
once associated with wanted to lower its
faculty contributions to TIAA-CREF to
reduce generous labor beneﬁts.  Not sur-
prisingly, this proposal was a nonstarter
with the faculty until the administration
grandfathered the current faculty from the
beneﬁt cuts and imposed the cuts on new
hires from a certain date onward.  This
policy was supported by the faculty and
implemented.  The moral of the story is
that grandfathering dramatically alters 
people’s voting behavior and can greatly
simplify the voting outcome.
Another problem I have with the model
is that ﬁrms supposedly have free entry
and do not face search frictions in ﬁnding
workers, whereas workers do face some
search frictions in ﬁnding ﬁrms.  So, I am
puzzled why anyone is unemployed in
equilibrium since you need both sides to
face frictions.  Unemployment implies
workers can’t ﬁnd ﬁrms and vice versa.
But if ﬁrms face no search frictions, then
as soon as a match ends, a competitive
firm should swoop in and instantly hire the
worker.  In fact, the current ﬁrm should
simply rehire the worker instantly, since
productivity increases occur instantly and
costlessly upon separation.2 If ﬁrms do
face search frictions, then it would seem
that the free-entry condition does not pro-
duce a zero-valued unmatched ﬁrm and the
solutions to the model are thus incorrect.
In summary, I conclude that the author
is working on an interesting and important
labor problem, particularly as it applies to
Europe.  He also has adopted an interest-
ing model for studying the issue and has
obtained some interesting and plausible
results for thinking about how voters will
line up either in favor of or in opposition
to changing labor laws.  Unfortunately, for
my tastes, there are some additional bodies
buried in the model’s intellectual basement
that need to be exhumed before I believe the
author has accurately captured the essence
of the problem.MAY/JUNE 1999
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